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Renegotiate the WTO "Schedules of
Commitments"?: Technological
Development and Treaty Interpretation
Shin-yi Pengt
The interpretation of schedules has been the subject of several Panel and
Appellate Body reports in recent years, and it is anticipated that challenges to
schedules related to information and communication technologies before the
dispute settlement body will increase. The recent decisions of the Panel and the
Appellate Body in EC-IT Products and China-Audiovisual Services may
become significant leading cases on the issues of how to interpret "schedules of
commitments" in this rapidly changing digital era. I conclude in this article
that the Panel appropriately recognized in EC-IT Products that the Informa-
tion Technology Agreement is not relevant in determining the object and pur-
pose of the WTO Agreement and therefore the complainants' interpretative
approach is overbroad and may compromise the legal certainty and predict-
ability of tariff concessions. However, I argue that the Panel should have elabo-
rated upon the question of how "technological development" and "product
evolution" should be dealt with in interpreting concessions. I also stress that in
China-Audiovisual Services the Appellate Body took a "brave" but necessary
position on the issue of whether the definition of "sound recording distribution
services" is alterable and evolutionary through time. In addition, the Appellate
Body clarified that the fact that a service was technically feasible and commer-
cially viable at the time of a member's World Trade Organization accession
does not necessarily mean that that member's commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services include that service. As the Appellate Body's
view alone is not a satisfactory basis for such an important holding, the final
part of this article suggests that the reasoning ought to be supported in light of
the principle of technological neutrality.
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Introduction-Technology Evolution, the WTO, and Challenges in
Interpreting the "Schedules" of Commitments
Digital convergence is an ongoing process.' The advent of digital tech-
nology has led to the emergence of a 'convergence' phenomenon. Com-
puters, telecommunications, and television, traditionally treated as
separate media industries regulated under different regulatory regimes, are
gradually emerging in the media industries, both at the global and national
levels.2 This means that networks previously in distinct markets can
1. It is evident that products and services in the information and communication
technologies sector have gone through a dramatic technological convergence. We all
experience the trend towards converting different kinds of information into data on
computer files and then delivering those files over the same wires or airwaves. Most of
us likely will get our telephone calls, television shows, recorded music, website access,
and e-mail over a single line via a single device, and as such, the distinctions between
each medium/device stop making sense.
2. The emergence of the convergence phenomenon is largely attributed to the
invention of digital technology in the 1990s, which makes possible the delivery of media
content in different technological forms. Richard Wu Wai Sang et al., Media Policy and
Regulation in the Age of Convergence- The Hong Kong Experience, 30 H.K. LJ. 454,
458-60 (2000).
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become direct competitors.3 In the ambit of international trade, unprece-
dented market changes have demonstrated that methods that worked in the
past to determine tariff concessions for goods or market access commit-
ments for services may no longer be the right approach today.4 The infor-
mation-communication sector has undergone significant changes, and the
economic activities related to information technology products are far
broader, more varied, and much more global than was generally under-
stood during the Uruguay Round and the Information Technology Agree-
ment (ITA) negotiations.5 Thus, a crucial question is whether these
commitments, which are more than a decade old, are sufficient to handle
today's commercial realities.6
In the past decade the tension between technological development and
treaty interpretation has increased, posing new challenges for the trade
negotiators and domestic regulators of information and communication
technology (ICT) industries worldwide.7 Empirical data has proven that
ICT-related "schedule of commitments"8 has been a subject of numerous
legal disputes. 9 With respect to the trend of digital convergence, problem-
atic interpretations of schedules in World Trade Organization (WTO) dis-
pute settlement show how frequently the question of classification, in
terms of both tariff commitments and General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
3. SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, THE WTO, THE INTERNET AND TRADE IN DIGITAL PROD-
UCTS 13-32 (2006).
4. As I will argue in parts I and II of this paper.
5. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information
Technology Products of 13 Dec. 1996, 9 17-18, WT/MIN(96)/16 (1996), [hereinafter
ITA].
6. See Shin-yi Peng, Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond, 41 J.
WORLD TRADE 293 (2007); see also Shin-yi Peng, Liberalization of Trade in Television Ser-
vices: The Negotiation Dilemma and Challenges for the Future, 43 J. WORLD TRADE 657
(2009).
7. Daniel Roseman, Domestic Regulation and Trade in Telecommunications Services:
Experience and Prospects Under the GATS, in DOMESTIC REGULATION & SERVICE TRADE
LIBERALIZATION 83 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvee eds., 2003); see also David Luff,
Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services: Considerations for a Convergence Policy at
the World Trade Organization Level, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 1059 (2004).
8. See generally WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON READING WTO GOODS AND SER-
VICES SCHEDULES 508 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Customs Classification
of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R
Uune 5, 1998); Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004); Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting
the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7,
2005); Request for Consultations by the United States, China-Measures Affecting Finan-
cial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS373/1, S/L/
320 (Mar. 5, 2008); First Written Submission of the United States of America, European
Communities and its Member States- Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology
Products, WT/DS375, WT/DS376, WT/DS377 (Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter First Sub-
mission of U.S., EC-IT Products]; Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trad-
ing Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual
Entertainment Products, WT/DS/363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, China-Audiovisual Services].
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vices (GATS) market access commitments, arises in practice.10 It is there-
fore necessary to examine the interpretation of schedules of commitments
in this rapidly changing digital era.
In goods, the specific commitments consist of maximum tariff levels.
For agricultural goods, schedules also include tariff quotas, limits on
export subsidies, and domestic support. In services, schedules contain
market-access commitments according to sector, and the interpretation of
service schedules defines the scope of these explicit commitments." WTO
Members' schedules form integral parts of the WTO-covered agreements.
Therefore, they are treaty text which must be interpreted according to cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law, codified in Arti-
cle 31 and, to the extent appropriate, Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.12 The Appellate Body has adopted this approach, and has gen-
erally not interpreted schedules differently from other WTO treaty
language. 13
The EC-Computer Equipment dispute first addressed whether panels
should interpret tariff schedules like treaty language.' 4 The Appellate Body
sided with the EC and explained that "[t]ariff negotiations are a process of
reciprocal demands and concessions, of 'give and take"'.' 5 In the Appellate
Body's view, decision makers should interpret the schedule like any treaty:
in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the treaty terms in context,
and in the light of the document's object and purpose.16 Because WTO
Members' schedules are "an integral part of the GATT 1994," they are sub-
ject to the same VCLT treaty interpretation principles that apply to GATT
1994.17 Since EC-Computer Equipment, panels and the Appellate Body have
consistently interpreted schedules on goods and services as treaty lan-
guage in accordance with VCLT Articles 31 and 32.18 In US-Gambling, the
Appellate Body confirmed its approach to the interpretation of goods
10. See generally China-Audiovisual Services and EC-IT Products, both of which are
discussed at length in the body of this paper.
11. See General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. XVI, XX, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183.
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31-32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, [hereinafter VCLT].
13. See Isabelle Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, 41 J.
WORLD TRADE 1, 8-52 (2007) [hereinafter Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of
Commitments]; see generally ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO
APPELLATE BODY 93-102 (2009) [hereinafter VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION].
14. Panel Report, European Communities- Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, 1 84, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (Feb. 5, 1998); Appellate
Body Report, European Communities- Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equip-
ment, 84, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS6/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5, 1998) [hereinaf-
ter Appellate Body Report, EC-Computer Equipment].
15. Appellate Body Report, EC-Computer Equipment, supra note 14, ' 109.
16. See VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 106.
17. Appellate Body Report, EC-Computer Equipment, supra note 14, 19 88, 109.
18. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities- Tariff Treatment of Certain Infor-
mation Technology Products, 9[ 7.1246, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R
(Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC-IT Products]; Appellate Body Report, Euro-
pean Communities- Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, 347, WT/
DS268/AB/R, WT/DS269/AB/R (Sept. 12, 2005).
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schedules in EC-Computer Equipment and reasoned that service schedules
should be interpreted in accordance with the customary principles of inter-
pretation in public international law.19
Some commentators have stressed that the bilateral and contractual
nature of schedule negotiations may influence the weight given to certain
modes of interpretation in the VCLT. 20 Nevertheless, the concept of "an
integral part of the WTO covered Agreements" has been repeatedly empha-
sized by the Appellate Body.2 1 The Appellate Body dismissed the idea of
differential interpretative treatment of schedules on the basis of the need to
guarantee the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system
set out in Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Article 3.2.22 Thus far,
the Appellate Body has not questioned the status of schedules of commit-
ments as treaty language. 2 3 Neither has the Appellate Body approached the
interpretation of schedules differently from the interpretation of other
WTO obligations.2 4
The interpretation of schedules has been the subject of several panel
and Appellate Body reports in recent years, and it is anticipated that the
ICT-related schedules will increasingly be challenged before the Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB). 2 5 The assumption of the Appellate Body that
schedules represent the common agreement among WTO Members, and
should be interpreted accordingly, becomes even more complex in the face
of ever-changing technology. The first part of this Article will discuss the
implications of technological change for tariff and service schedules. Next,
I will explore the issues of the approaches taken in China-Audiovisual Ser-
vices and EC-IT Products and analyze the limits of the Vienna Convention in
identifying the "common intention" of Members. In the final part of this
Article, I will briefly summarize and further stress the importance of inte-
grating the principle of technological neutrality into the WTO Law.
I. Technological Development and Tariff Schedules
A. The EC-Computer Equipment Dispute-Legitimate Expectations
The EC-Computer Equipment dispute concerns the customs classifica-
19. See generally Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, supra
note 13, at 1, 10.
20. Id. Tariff concessions are often negotiated for a considerable period of time on a
bilateral basis between WTO Members without the possibility of the involvement of all
WTO Members. The process of negotiating, drafting, and concluding schedules of com-
mitments can be unilateral in various degrees.
21. See WTO Legal Texts: Countries' Schedules of Commitments, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
22. See Van Damme, The Interpretation of Schedules of Commitments, supra note 13,
at 9.
23. See VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 108.
24. See id. at 8.
25. Peng, Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond, supra note 6, at
315-17 (2007).
407
Cornell International Law Journal
tion in the European Communities (EC or EU26 ) of local area network
(LAN) equipment2 7 and multimedia PCs. 28 As part of the Uruguay Round,
the EC had bound its tariff rates for automatic data processing (ADP)
machines at 4.9%.29 The plaintiff, the United States, asserted that the EC
classified LAN equipment and PCs as ADP machines during the Uruguay
Round and for a short period after its conclusion. In May 1995, however,
the EC adopted a new regulation classifying LAN adapter cards as telecom-
munications apparatus, a category subject to generally higher duties, in the
range of 4.6% to 7.5%. With respect to multimedia PCs, in April 1996, a
United Kingdom tribunal upheld a customs administration determination
classifying PCs with multimedia capabilities as television receivers, thereby
subjecting those machines to a 14% tariff.30
In its EC-Computer Equipment report, the Panel discussed at length
whether the "legitimate expectations" of the United States were relevant for
establishing a violation of GATT Article II. The panel referred to the United
States' legitimate expectations of access to the EC as a contextual source
for interpreting the EC's tariff schedule.3 1 On appeal, the Appellate Body
rejected this reasoning, observing that "[t]he security and predictability of
tariff concessions would be seriously undermined if the concessions in
Members' Schedules were to be interpreted on the basis of the subjective
views of certain exporting Members alone." 3 2 The Appellate Body empha-
sized that the security and predictability of "the reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade" is an object and purpose of the WTO Agree-
ment.33 The Appellate Body was of the view that the "legitimate expecta-
tions" of an exporting Member are not relevant in determining whether the
EC violated Article 11:1 of the GATT1994.3 4
Rather, the Appellate Body chose to rest its interpretation on the meth-
odology set forth in Article 31 of the VCLT, and explained that "the pur-
pose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is
26. For the purpose of this paper, the terms of "EC" and "EU" are interchangeable.
The European Union (until November 30, 2009, known officially in the WTO as the
European Communities for legal reasons) has been a WTO member since January 1,
1995. Since December 1, 2009, "European Union" has been the official name in the
WTO as well as the outside world.
27. For example, network or adaptor cards, along with devices such as hubs,
bridges, routers, repeaters, LAN switches, and various cables and modules constitute
LAN equipment.
28. That is, personal computers.
29. Schedule LXXX of the European Communities, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embody-
ing the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/schedulese/eec.zip.
30. Panel Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain Computer
Equipment, 11 2.19-2.21, 4.8, WT/DS62/R, WT/DS67/R, WT/DS68/R (Feb. 5, 1998).
31. Id. 9[q 8.23-8.28.
32. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, 'j 80, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5,
1998) (emphasis added).
33. Id. ? 82.
34. Id. TI 80-99.
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to ascertain the common intentions of the parties." 3 5 These common inten-
tions, as stressed by the Appellate Body, cannot be ascertained on the basis
of the subjective and unilaterally determined "expectations" of one of the
parties to a treaty. The Appellate Body consulted a wide range of sources in
determining meaning of the EC's tariff concession. This meaning exceeded
the expectations of all countries involved in the litigation and accurately
approximated the common intent of all parties to the treaty.3 6
To conclude, in EC-Computer Equipment-a leading case on how tech-
nological change may impact tariff schedules-when faced with the inter-
pretation of "Automatic Data Processing Equipment" in a tariff schedule,
the Appellate Body did not question whether it would be useful to examine
how concessions in schedules of goods and services were negotiated,
drafted, and concluded. It appears that the Appellate Body did contemplate
the possibility that schedules may be of a different character than treaties
and therefore may require more tailored interpretative methods. Nonethe-
less, it rejected the alternative to treaty interpretation, i.e., interpreting the
schedules in the light of "legitimate expectations" of the exporting WTO
Members, on the ground that this would undermine the security and pre-
dictability of schedules. The Appellate Body upheld a rigid application of
the DSU Article 3.2, and stressed that "the common intentions [of the Mem-
bers] cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective and unilaterally
determined expectations of one of the parties to the treaty."3 7 However, as I
will discuss in Section III, the disputing parties in China-Audiovisual Ser-
vices as well as in EC-IT Products also articulated arguments in favor of a
similar approach-to rely on the factual evidence that is of entirely subjec-
tive character.
B. The EC-IT Products Dispute-"Evolving" Coverage
The ongoing litigation brought by the United States, Japan, and Tai-
wan3 8 against the EC tariff regime regarding IT products is another exam-
ple of how technological changes may impact tariff schedules. 39 The EC
has classified flat panel computer monitors with digital video interface
(DVI) under tariff codes that are not covered by the ITA, and has subjected
them to a 14% duty. The core question is whether the EC is entitled to
35. Id. '1 84.
36. Chios Carmody, WTO Obligations as Collective, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 419 (2006).
37. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
Computer Equipment, 91 84, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5,
1998) (emphasis added).
38. On May 28, 2008, the United States and Japan requested WTO consultations
with the EC with respect to its tariff treatment of certain information technology prod-
ucts. They were joined by Taiwan on June 12, 2008. The EC then blocked the panel case
on August 29, 2008. EC Blocks Panel in IT Case and Appeals Compliance Findings in
Banana Case, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 29, 2008), http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
news08_e/dsb_29aug08_e.htm; see generally Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu-e.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
39. See generally Second Written Submission of the European Communities, Tariff
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, 2-8, WT/DS375, WT/DS376,
WT/DS377 (June 16, 2009) [hereinafter Second Submission of EC, EC-IT Products].
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exclude the "flat panel display devices" from the scope of concessions
merely because they are capable of receiving and reproducing signals from
both "automatic data processing machines" and other sources.40 In addi-
tion, under the EC tariff regime, only a product with a telephony-based or
cable-based modem qualifies for duty-free treatment. Thus, any product
that communicates using a wireless, ISDN, or Ethernet modem is reclassi-
fied out of the duty-free tariff line and is subject to a 14% duty.4 ' Moreo-
ver, the EC issued a new regulation classifying multifunction printers
having scanning, laser printing, and laser copying capabilities, under the
HS subheading 9009.12-photocopying apparatus, carrying a 6% duty.4 2
The EC is an original participant in the ITA, and modified its Schedule
in accordance with the procedures indicated in the previous section.4 3 The
EC incorporated the tariff commitments set out in Attachment A and
Attachment B into its Schedule.4 4 Attachment A defines products by tariff
heading, and Attachment B provides a narrative description of specific
products covered by the ITA. Those commitments thus became a part of the
EC Schedule, as stipulated in GATT 1994 Article II:1.45 As a result, those
tariff commitments became WTO obligations of the EC pursuant to Arti-
cles 11:1(a) 4 6 and 11:1(b) 47 of the GATT 1994.48 A dispute arose regarding
40. See id. 204.
41. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 11 7.764-7.770, WT/DS375/R,
WT/DS376/R, WT/DS277/R (Aug. 16, 2010).
42. First Written Submission of Japan, European Communities and Its Member
States-Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, 4-5, WT/DS375,
WT/DS376, WT/DS377 (Mar. 5, 2009) thereinafter First Submission of Japan, EC-IT
Products].
43. See ITA, supra note 5, at 1; see also Information Technology: Schedules of Conces-
sions, WORLD ]7RADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/inftec e/
itscheds e.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
44. ITA, supra note 5, at 2 states that:
Pursuant to the modalities set forth in the Annex to this Declaration, each party
shall bind and eliminate customs duties and other duties and charges of any
kind, within the meaning of Article 11:1(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, with respect to the following:
(a) all products classified (or classifiable) with Harmonized System (1996)
("HS") headings listed in Attachment A to the Annex to this Declaration; and
(b) all products specified in Attachment B to the Annex to this Declaration,
whether or not they are included in Attachment A; through equal rate reduc-
tions of customs duties beginning in 1997 and concluding in 2000, recogniz-
ing that extended staging of reductions and, before implementation,
expansion of product coverage may be necessary in limited circumstances.
45. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (as incorporated in General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1994)).
46. Id. at 55 U.N.T.S. 200 ("Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of
the other contracting parties treatment no less favorable than that provided for in the
appropriate Part of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.").
47. Id., which reads:
The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting
party, which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on
their importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to
the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt
Vol. 45410
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whether certain products are within the scope of the tariff concessions
made by the EC pursuant to the ITA as the complainants alleged, or if they
are within the scope of other EC Schedule concessions, which do not pro-
vide for duty-free treatment. 4 9
With respect to "Flat Panel Display Devices," the EC pointed out that
the multifunctional LCD monitor "did not exist at the time the concessions
were being negotiated."5 0 Importantly, this casts light on the circum-
stances under which the concessions were made in view of the extremely
detailed technical language used in the narrative of the product definitions
in attachment B to the ITA. The EC stressed how radical changes in moni-
tor technology from the time the ITA was negotiated rendered it exception-
ally difficult to define a "monitor" in order to place it in the relevant legal
framework. 5 ' It argued that the multifunctional LCD monitor, which can
usually display even television signals, fundamentally challenges the estab-
lished legal categorizations.52 The EC asserted that the WTO Members
should realize that the multifunctional LCD monitor is a "new product,"
the result of the convergence of the IT and the multimedia consumer elec-
tronics industries.5 3
With respect to "Set Top Boxes which have a Communication Func-
tion," it seemed to the EC that all the three complainants agree that the
dispute depends on the interpretation of the narrative description of cer-
tain set top boxes contained in the EC Schedule and the ITA. In the EC's
view, however, the complainants misinterpret the content of the descrip-
tion.5 4 If interpreted correctly, the narrative description does not support
their claim. The EC classifies set top boxes that connect to the Internet via
ISDN, W-LAN, or Ethernet devices in heading 8528 71 19 (i.e., outside the
duty-free heading 8528 71 13) because ISDN/W-LAN/Ethernet devices are
not "modems."5 5 The set top boxes that are at issue are not entitled to the
ITA treatment because they simply do not fulfill the narrative descrip-
from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein.
Such products shall also be exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind
imposed on or in connection with the importation in excess of those imposed
on the date of this Agreement or those directly and mandatorily required to be
imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the importing territory on that date.
48. Id.
49. If "Flat Panel Display Devices," "Set Top Boxes which have a Communication
Function," and "Multifunctional Machines" are within the scope of the tariff concessions
made by the EC pursuant to the ITA, then the tariff commitments at issue are contained
in the EC Schedule. As such, the EC's actions to impose duties on the products in ques-
tion are inconsistent with Article 11: 1(a) and (b) of the GATT.
50. First Written Submission of the European Communities, European Communi-
ties- Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, '1 30-49, WT/DS/





54. Id. ' 208
55. Id. '1 265-80 (emphasis added).
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tion.5 6 In the EC's view,5 7 the complainants avoided addressing any differ-
ence between the product existing at the time of the conclusion of the ITA
(e.g., telephony-based or cable modem) and the product of today (i.e.,
ISDN, W-LAN or Ethernet devices) under dispute.58
With respect to the "Multifunctional Machines," contrary to the com-
plainants' assertions, 5 9 the EC asserts that multifunctional machines are
not technologically advanced versions of printers. According to the EC,
multifunctional machines are best described as different devices, each with
a specific function (photocopiers, printers and/or facsimile machines), that
have been merged into a single machine capable of performing various
functions simultaneously. 60 Major manufacturers, such as Ricoh and
Canon, describe their range of multifunctional machines as being "copier-
based."61 The EC asserts the essential difference between analogue photo-
copying and digital photocopying is that the latter digitalizes the image,
but this difference does not bring digital photocopiers outside the scope of
HS96 9009 12.62 Thus, multifunctional machines cannot be classified
directly under subheading 8471 60 unless they are used "solely or princi-
pally" with a computer.63
It is interesting to review the creativity of the arguments and the inter-
pretations as to whether a new product can be assumed to be covered by
the concessions simply because it performs similar functions as a product
that is covered by the concessions. Was the narrative description of the
Attachment B to the ITA written in a way to accommodate technical devel-
opments of the products? Are we really convinced that the Members' com-
mitments flowing from the ITA are "open-ended" and "accumulate any new
product"?
C. Renegotiate the Tariff Commitments?
During the early stages of the development of information technology,
the EC-Computer Equipment dispute raised the question of how to interpret
tariff concessions considering the technological changes. The ongoing liti-
gation on EC-IT Products provides an opportunity to revisit the issue of
56. In response to the complainant's argument that "any kind of digital-to-analog
converter constitutes a modem," the EC argued that such a proposition, if accepted,
would lead to the absurd situation where any device that converts signals would be a
modem, e.g., a television or an MP3/MP4 player would be considered a modem. Id.; see
also Second Written Submission by the European Communities, European Communi-
ties- Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, 11 20-32, WT/DS/
375, WT/DS/376, WT/DS/377 Uune 16, 2009) [hereinafter Second Submission by EC,
EC-IT Products].
57. First Submission of EC, EC-IT Products, supra note 50, 91 205-35.
58. Id.
59. Id. 919 330-38.
60. Id.
61. Furthermore, many manufacturers of multifunctional machines market some of
their machines in a copy-only version, with the printing and fax functions being offered
as options. Id. 1 333.
62. Id. 9191 371-72.
63. Second Submission by EC, EC-IT Products, supra note 56, 11 125-33.
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tariff classification, and to offer a creative space for treaty interpretation
under this digital convergence trend.
On one hand, technology is organic: new features were being devel-
oped and advances were made "before the ink [was] dry" on the ITA. 64 As
argued by the United States Trade Representative, "if ITA participants only
provided duty-free treatment to the products with technologies that existed
at the time the ITA was concluded, very few ITA products would be eligible
for duty-free treatment today."6 5 The IT sector is organic and technologi-
cally innovative; it is an area where evolution is the nature of the beast, and
thus, we must read the existing commitments accordingly. ITA was
intended to be much more inclusive and dynamic. Otherwise, eventually
nothing would be covered by the ITA, simply because technology by its
very nature evolves. 66 Trade regimes, therefore, are urged to "evolve in a
manner that enhances market access opportunities for information tech-
nology products." 67
On the other hand, information technology has been evolving rapidly
and is converging with entertainment, communication, and other technolo-
gies, thereby creating an ever increasing potential for specific information
technology products to fall within the scope of the ITA. The EC argued that
judicial interpretation may not be the appropriate way to clarify whether
certain products are covered by the ITA. Members must revisit the product
coverage by means of consensus, not only by litigation. What is covered
and what is not covered is significant and will form a forever and rapidly
changing landscape. In the view of the EC, it is necessary to renegotiate the
64. Ambassador Susan C. Schwab, United States Trade Representative, USTR




66. Indeed, as the Preamble to the ITA suggests, the ITA was concluded in part for
the purpose of encouraging innovation and the spread of technology throughout the
world. The ITA Preamble states that the ITA's declarations were made:
Considering the key role of trade in information technology products in the
development of information industries and in the dynamic expansion of the
world economy,
Recognizing the goals of raising standards of living and expanding the produc-
tion of and trade in goods;
Desiring to achieve maximum freedom of world trade in information technology
products;
Desiring to encourage the continued technological development of the informa-
tion technology industry on a world-wide basis;
Mindful of the positive contribution information technology makes to global
economic growth and welfare;
Having agreed to put into effect the results of these negotiations which involve
concessions additional to those included in the Schedules attached to the Mar-
rakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, and
Recognizing that the results of these negotiations also involve some concessions
offered in negotiations leading to the establishment of Schedules annexed to the
Marrakesh Protocol.
ITA, supra note 5, pmbl.
67. ITA, supra note 5, 1 1 (emphasis added).
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ITA in the face of ever-changing technology.68 More importantly, there is a
need to further develop a mechanism that will allow us to deal with techno-
logical change.69
Indeed, a cursory analysis of relevant provisions of the ITA reveals that
the treaty language is not entirely clear. The preamble and paragraph 1 of
the ITA seem to support the complainants' interpretation of the EC Sched-
ule. In particular, the complainants referred to provisions such as the aim
of "achiev[ing] maximum freedom of world trade in information technol-
ogy products,"70 that the ITA "endeavors to encourage the continued tech-
nological development of the information technology industry,"71 and that
trade regimes "should evolve in a manner that enhances market access
opportunities for information technology products."72 Do these provisions
reflect that the ITA participants contemplated a "positive evolution in mar-
ket access"?73 It is arguable that if every advance in technology necessi-
tated renegotiating, economic operators would be discouraged from
innovating.74 From this perspective, the objective embodied in the ITA pro-
visions reflects an attempt to encourage technological development. If we
take a closer look at paragraph 3 of the ITA Annex75 on a mechanism for
"future negotiations" and for "updating the product coverage," however, it
seems that the ITA participants were well aware of the rapidly advancing
nature of the IT industry, and they did not expect the ITA's language was to
cover every "new product" that may come along in the rapidly converging
IT sector.76 Together, how should the above provisions be read? Further,
how should the scope of the existing concessions in the ITA be decided?
II. Technological Development and GATS Schedules
A. The China-Audiovisual Services Dispute -Confusing Fact-Finding
Process and the Misleading Evidence
Just as the interpretations of GATT provisions have dynamically
evolved in response to the several hundred GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures, so the interpretation of GATS provisions will evolve over time. In the
68. European Commission to Seek ITA Renegotiation on Four Points, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(July 25, 2008), http://wtonewsstand.com/component/option,comppv/ltemid,445/
id,2298990.
69. Id.
70. ITA, supra note 5, pmbl.
71. Id.
72. Id. 1.
73. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 1 7.355.
74. First Submission of U.S., EC-IT Products, supra note 9, 1 61.
75. Participants shall meet periodically under the auspices of the Council on Trade
in Goods to review the product coverage specified in the Attachments, with a view to
agreeing, by consensus, whether in the light of technological developments, experience
in applying the tariff concessions, or changes to the HS nomenclature, the Attachments
should be modified to incorporate additional products, and to consult on non-tariff bar-
riers to trade in information technology products. Such consultations shall be without
prejudice to rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. ITA, supra note 5, 3.
76. First Submission of EC, EC-IT Products, supra note 50, 15.
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context of services trade, the China-Audiovisual Services dispute,7 7 which
directly involves the interaction with technological change, has practical
significance for classification and scheduling issues.
China, in its GATS Schedule, made both market access and national
treatment commitments regarding sound recording distribution services.
In particular, under market access for mode 3 in Sector 2D, China commit-
ted to permit foreign service suppliers to establish contractual joint ven-
tures with Chinese partners to engage in sound recording distribution.7 8
China scheduled no national treatment limitations under mode 3 for these
Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures.79 Given these commitments,
Chinese foreign contractual joint ventures, including majority foreign-
owned joint ventures, likewise should enjoy national treatment regarding
sound recording distribution. The Chinese domestic legal framework,8 0
however, greatly limits the ability of foreign-invested enterprises to engage
in the distribution of sound recordings by prohibiting these enterprises
from engaging in their electronic distribution, for example, through the
Internet and mobile telecommunications networks. 8 '
This prohibition does not extend to wholly Chinese-owned enter-
prises. In other words, China's measures, by creating a regime for sound
recording distribution that treats foreign-invested sound recordings distrib-
77. See Appellate Body Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 9; Appellee
Submission of the United States of America, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/AB/3 (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Appellee Submission of the U.S., China-
Audiovisual Services]; Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distri-
bution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/
DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services]; Oral
Statement of the United States at the Second Substantive Meeting of the Panel, China-
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363 (Sept. 23, 2008) [hereinafter Second
Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services]; Second Written Submission of
the United States, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363 (Aug. 29,
2008) [hereinafter Second Submission of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services]; Oral
Statement of the United States at the First Substantive Meeting of the Panel, China-
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363 (July 22, 2008) [hereinafter First Oral
Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services]; First Written Submission of China,
China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publica-
tions and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter:
First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services]; First Written Submission of the
United States, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Cer-
tain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363 (May 13, 2008)
[hereinafter First Submission of U.S., China-Audiovisual Services].
78. See Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, at
qT 7.1300-7.1311.
79. See id. at 1 7.1314.
80. First Submission of U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, at 357.
81. "China maintains these restriction through three measures: (1) the Interim Rules
on the Management of Internet Culture . . . ; (2) the Notice of the Ministry of Culture on
Some Issues Relating to Implementation of the 'Interim Rules on the Management of Internet
Culture' . . . ; (3) and the Several Opinions on the Development and Management of Net-
work Music . . . ." Id. 140.
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utors much less favorably than wholly Chinese-owned sound recording dis-
tributors, impose more stringent requirements on foreign-invested
enterprises than their wholly Chinese-owned counterparts. The United
States therefore claimed that China's measures are inconsistent with Article
XVII of the GATS. 82 China argued, however, that at the time of the negotia-
tion of China's GATS commitments, the legal framework governing the
exploitation of music, and more precisely, the distribution of sound record-
ings, addressed exclusively the distribution of sound recordings in their
traditional, hardcopy format.8 3 China further argued that, when properly
applied, the rules of treaty interpretation confirm that network music ser-
vices are not covered by its GATS commitments and that those commit-
ments are strictly limited to the distribution of sound recordings in
physical form.8 4
Both parties submitted a significant amount of evidence in support of
their respective positions. To argue that network music services did not
constitute an established business operating within a legal framework at
the time of negotiations on China's accession to the WTO, China submit-
ted several pieces of evidence, arguing that network music services only
emerged fully after China acceded to the WTO in 2001.85 Until the break-
through of network music services around 2003, these services were
largely illegal. No international consensus on the protection of Intellectual
Property Rights had been reached allowing a worldwide legal exploitation
of music over the Internet until the entry into force of the WIPO Copyright
Treaty in 2002. In China, the first network music service platforms were
launched around 2001.86 Therefore, the electronic distribution of sound
recordings was a new phenomenon that did not exist at the time of China's
accession.8 7
The United States, on the other hand, argued that the circumstances
surrounding the conclusion of China's WTO accession demonstrated that
the electronic means of delivery for music were part of the landscape as
China's commitments were being negotiated, and that China was aware
that music was being distributed electronically at the time of China's acces-
sion. The United States provided additional exhibits to strengthen its argu-
ment that electronic distribution of sound recordings was a reality long
before China's accession and China itself was aware of this development,
including:8
82. See id., 11 140-55.
83. See First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 91 479.
84. Id, at 9191 389-403.
85. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 91 7.1161-7.1167.
86. First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77,
911 389-403.
87. Id. at 919 443-48.
88. Second Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77,
919 43-46; see, e.g., Second Submission of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra
note 77, 1 154; First Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note
77, 91 63.58-66, 68; First Submission of U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77,
91 51.
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- According to the testimony of David Hughes of Sony Music, Mr.
Hughes stated that he "first became involved in the digital distri-
bution of music in September 1996," a time period well before
China's WTO accession.8 9
* According to the Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI),
developments in online distribution of music "build on a process
that goes back to 1998 when eMusic.com began selling MP3 sin-
gles and albums on the web in the U.S."9 0
* Steamwaves, another American service, was launched in 1999 and
was one of the first to offer a streaming subscription service. 9 '
* China's own involvement in the international forum dating back to
the early 1990s, demonstrates that China, like the WTO Members
with which it was negotiating, was aware of the electronic distribu-
tion of music prior to its WTO accession. For example, in October
1995 at the WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Intellectual
Creations in the Information Society, Mr. Shen Rengan, Deputy
Director General of the National Copyright Administration of
China in Beijing, participated in a working session.9 2
- Within the WTO context, discussions regarding electronic delivery
of services also took place prior to China's accession. For example,
the Work Programme On Electronic Commerce - Progress Report
to the General Council states that "[ilt was the general view that
the electronic delivery of services falls within the scope of the
GATS, since the Agreement applies to all services regardless of the
means by which they are delivered, and that electronic delivery can
take place under any of the four modes of supply."93
* In early 2000, a Houston-based company and the Government of
China formed a joint venture to launch an MP3 website. This was a
website permitting the electronic delivery of sound recordings
from the Internet to a user's MP3 music listening device.94
* Numerous websites, such as chinamp3.com and suflash.com, were
distributing music electronically in China prior to 2000.95
89. Adjustment of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satel-
lite Digital Audio Radio Services, No. 2006-1 CRB DSTRA, at 1 (Copyright Royalty
Board, Oct. 10, 2006) (testimony of David Hughes), available at http://www.loc.gov/
crb/proceedings/2006-1/soundex-hughes.pdf.
90. IFPI Online Music Report, DIGITAL Music REP. (Int'l Fed'n of the Phonographic
Indus., Zurich, Switz.), Jan. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/
digital-music-report-2004.pdf.
91. Streamwaves Partners With The Excite Network to Launch Subscription Music Ser-
vices on Excite and iWon Websites, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 17, 2003), http://
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/streamwaves-partners-with-the-excite-network-to-
launch-subscription-music-services-on-excite-and-iwon-websites-74689412.html.
92. First Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77.
93. Progress Report to the General Council, Adopted by the Council for Trade in
Services on 19 July 1999, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, S/L/74 (Jul. 27,
1999).
94. First Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 9S 66.
95. Id.
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Certainly, with respect to supplementary means of interpretation
under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, the circumstances of conclu-
sion, the fact-finding process, and the numerous evidence and exhibits are
rather confusing, if not misleading. Both parties seemed to focus princi-
pally on the questions of "whether the electronic distribution of sound
recordings was unknown at the time of China's December 2001 accession
to the WTO," "whether the electronic distribution of sound recordings was
a phenomenon known to China and other WTO Members before China
joined the WTO," or "whether China was unaware of the existence of the
joint venture between the Chinese government and a Houston-based com-
pany to supply music online and therefore was unaware of the electronic
distribution at the time of its WTO accession."96 The core questions then
become: How well should a trade negotiator understand the development
of technology, and to what extent can it be relevant in the context of Article
32 of the Vienna Convention? Why is it so critically important for the par-
ties in dispute to demonstrate the negotiators' awareness of the current
status of technology? How can the fact, if proven, that the electronic distri-
bution of sound recordings was a phenomenon known to China at the time
of China's accession, affect the panel's decision? And the further puzzle
arises as to whether very similar or identically worded commitments (e.g.,
cellular mobile phone services) could be given different meanings (e.g. 2G
v. 3G mobile services) depending on the date of a Member's accession to
the WTO (e.g. 1994 for Korea v. 2002 for Taiwan) because the meaning to
be attributed to those terms can only be the meaning that they had at the
time the Schedule was concluded. 97
B. Renegotiate the GATS Specific Commitments?
At the core of the issue is the "temporal variation" in language. 98 Lan-
guage is under a constant movement, and varies incrementally over time.99
It changes depending on the social context and technological environment.
In the context of technology, "old language" acquires partly or even com-
pletely new meanings.100 Such changes must also affect the language used
in treaties.101
We cannot deny that the meaning of "sound recording distribution
services" at the time of China's accession to the WTO was substantially
different from that of "sound recording distribution services" at the time of
interpretation by the Panel. To illustrate, the increasing adoption of broad-
band and mobile technologies and the widespread adoption of
smartphones and portable music playing devices continue to drive the digi-
tal music market. Sales of recorded music in CD format have declined
steadily since 2000, as consumers increasingly have moved toward digital
96. Id.
97. Section III of this paper will further discuss those issues.
98. ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES, 73-95 (2007).




2012 Renegotiate the WTO "Schedules of Commitments"?
downloading. 10 2 The majority of music is now sold in digital format,
downloaded by consumers to laptops, MP3 players, or other devices.
According to the IFPI report, in 2009, for the first time ever, more than a
quarter of the recorded music industry's global revenues (27%) came from
digital channels.103 In the United States, the world's largest music market,
online and mobile revenues now account for around 40% of music
sales.10 4 Particularly noteworthy, mobile digital contents continued to per-
form favorably, achieving major growth of 39% in sales of full single-track
downloads service, which accounted for 60% of all mobile digital contents,
and 53% of overall digital music delivery in terms of sales.' 0 5 The music
industry landscape, indeed, has been undergoing major structural changes
as companies from other industries become integrated into music distribu-
tion, and business models transform to adapt to changing market
demands. Thus, in its written submissions, China repeatedly stated that
the only viable way to address this unresolved issue should be via requests-
offers negotiation, rather than the "fast track" of the WTO dispute settle-
ment mechanism.10 6
China-Audiovisual Services may have a wider impact on the interpreta-
tion of GATS schedules of commitments, especially the sectors in which
technology-enabled businesses are developing most rapidly. Shall we inter-
pret a GATS market access commitment using the "ordinary meaning" at
the time of its conclusion (i.e., historical language) or the "ordinary mean-
ing" at the time of interpretation (i.e., contemporary language)?1 07
The following part explains how to tackle the problem caused by these
social variations for the interpretation of treaties, and how a schedule of
commitment is interpreted to include a new product or service not existing
at the time of negotiation.
III. A Critical Review of the Interpretative Approaches Taken in the
Disputes of EC-IT Products and China-Audiovisual Services
A. The "Object and Purpose" of the Treaty' 08
1. Goods Schedules: Enhance Market Access for IT Products?
The recent decisions of the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC-IT
Products and China-Audiovisual Services touched upon a number of issues
102. IFPI Digital Music Report, DIGITAL Music REP. (Int'l Fed'n of the Phonographic
Indus., Zurich, Switz.), Jan. 2010, available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/sec-
tion-statistics/index.html (last visited March 8, 2010).
Music How, When, Where You Want It, DIGITAL Music REP. (Int'l Fed'n of the Phono-





106. First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 1 448.
107. LINDERFALK, supra note 98, at 73-95.
108. VCLT, supra note 12, art. 31 states:
General rule of interpretation
419
Cornell International Law Journal
of ongoing significance to the treaty interpretation in this digital world. In
EC-IT Products, the complainants argued that the ITA may be relevant in
analyzing the "object and purpose" of the GATT 1994 because the ITA is an
instrument related to the GATT 1994.109 As indicated in Section II-C of
this article, the ITA arguably contains a number of mechanisms to
encourage technological development, including broad product coverage
and Attachment B. In the complainants' view, those provisions in the ITA
that express the desire such as "to achieve maximum freedom of world
trade in information technology products" contradict the EC's view that a
digital product should no longer be entitled to duty-free treatment simply
because technology advances.11 0 To some degree, it is fair to say that the
complainants seek to justify an extensive reading of the scope of ITA by
arguing that it is necessary in order to further the "object and purpose" of
the ITA.111 It is their position that the EC concession must cover "all"
devices that fit squarely within its terms regardless of how their other func-
tionality may change or improve over time.112
The Panel faced several questions, including: Is there an interpretative
principle whereby tariff concessions must be broadly construed in order to
promote the expansion of trade between Members? Was the complainants'
interpretative approach overbroad, therefore compromising the legal cer-
tainty and predictability of tariff concessions, and creating the risk that
Members would become reluctant to pursue the ITA liberalization process?
In the Panel Report, the Panel took the position that provisions of the
ITA were not relevant to determining the object and purpose of the WTO
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an
instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
109. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 1 7.538.
110. Id.
111. Such an approach, however, has been strongly criticized by the EC as "a short-
sighted," "simplistic way" of reading the treaty that may have negative systemic implica-
tion. Executive Summary of the Oral Statement by the European Communities at the
First Substantive Meeting, European Communities- Tariff Treatment of Certain Informa-
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Agreement. The Panel pointed out that the ITA constitutes a separate pluri-
lateral arrangement made among a subset of WTO Members. Due to the
application of the most-favored nation principle and Article II of the GATT
1994, the duty bindings agreed to by the ITA participants were also
extended to all WTO Members. The objectives of the ITA participants of
having tariff regimes "evolve" in a manner that "enhances market access for
information technology products" and "encourag[ing] the continued tech-
nological development of the information technology industry" could not
be considered a basis for determining the object and purpose of the WTO
Agreement and the GATT 1994.113 Having said that, the Panel indicated
that the relevant object and purpose in the dispute was the "general object
and purpose" of the WTO Agreement as a whole, including the GATT 1994,
which was to provide security and predictability in the reciprocal and
mutually advantageous concessions negotiated by parties for the reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to trade." 4 The Panel then concluded that by
interpreting the terms of the relevant EC concessions in light of "the 'gen-
eral object and purpose' of the WTO Agreement as a whole," it saw nothing
that would override or contradict its preliminary conclusion that the EC
concessions require duty-free treatment for the products in dispute." 5 In
other words, based on the general object and purpose of the WTO Agree-
ment as a whole, not the ITA, the Panel reached the conclusion that the
objectives of security and predictability required that concessions cover
products that did not exist in that form when the concessions were granted
as long as they complied with the wording of the concessions
concerned.116
2. Services Schedules: "Sufficiently Generic" Terms?
In China-Audiovisual Services, the "object and purpose" of the GATS
played a significant role in determining China's commitments. In its first
submission, the Chinese government argued that unduly extending the
scope of Members' GATS commitments would contradict the principle of
progressive liberalization reflected in the Preamble, which stipulates that
the Agreement is aimed at establishing "a multilateral framework of princi-
ples and rules for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such
trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization."" 7
The principle of progressive liberalization is reflected in the structure of
the GATS, which contemplates that WTO Members undertake specific
commitments through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations with a
view to liberalizing their service markets incrementally, rather than imme-
diately and completely at the time of the acceptance of the GATS.'ns1 In
light of this general object and purpose, China also asserted that the princi-
113. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 3 7.548.
114. Id., 4 7.549, 7.1329 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id., 3 7.927.
117. First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 3 507.
118. Id.
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ple of progressive liberalization required the Panel to base its analysis of the
relevant terms in China's GATS Schedule on their meaning at the time of
China's accession to the WTO.119
The United States responded that compliance with current commit-
ments was essential to the credibility and future success of progressive lib-
eralization.1 20 On appeal, China again claimed that the Panel interpreted
the entry "sound recording distribution services" according to its contem-
porary meaning, but that the principle of progressive liberalization did not
allow for the expansion of the scope of the commitments of a WTO Mem-
ber by interpreting the terms used in the Schedule based on the meaning of
those terms at the time of interpretation.12 1
The Appellate Body found that the task of ascertaining the meaning of
a concession in a Schedule, like the task of interpreting any other treaty
text, involves identifying the common intention of the Members.' 2 2 Regard-
ing the "object and purpose" of the GATS, the decisive paragraph of the
Appellate Body decision reads as follows:
We consider that the terms used in China's GATS Schedule ('sound record-
ing' and 'distribution') are sufficiently generic that what they apply to may
change over time. In this respect, we note that GATS Schedules, like the
GATS itself and all WTO agreements, constitute multilateral treaties with
continuing obligations that WTO Members entered into for an indefinite
period of time, regardless of whether they were original Members or acceded
after 1995.123
In other words, the Appellate Body threw in a wild card by stating that
the commitments in dispute were generic terms. The Appellate Body
appeared to be implying that the content of "generic terms," such as
"sound recording" and "distribution," are assumed by the Members to
change over time.' 2 4 On that basis, the Appellate Body concluded that the
analysis supported the interpretation of China's commitment on "sound
recording distribution services" as including the electronic distribution of
sound recordings.12 5 Interestingly, the Appellate Body did not refer to any
GATS provisions supporting this proposition. Nor did it address how to
determine if a term is "generic" enough or elaborate on the distinction
between "time-bound" and "timeless" WTO obligations.12 6 This raised a
critical question as to the definitions of Members' GATS Specific Commit-
ments.127 Are we really convinced that WTO Members' commitments flow-
ing from the GATS, when expressed in a "sufficiently generic way," are
"open-ended" and "accumulate any new services"? The key questions
119. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, '1 7.1219.
120. Appellee Submission of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77,
9 106.
121. Id.
122. Appellate Body Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 9.
123. Id. 9 396 (emphasis added).
124. See generally RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION, 172-73 (2008).
125. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77.
126. Id.
127. GARDINER, supra note 124, at 172-73.
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remain unanswered. It could be argued that the Appellate Body did not go
far enough in its "activism."
B. The "State of Technology" that Existed at the Time of the
Negotiations
1. Goods Schedules: Technological Development and Product Evolution
The supplementary interpretation principle "the circumstances of con-
clusion" of the treaty, under the Article 32 of the VCLT, 128 was heavily
relied upon by the parties in EC-IT Products and China-Audiovisual Services.
Were the terms of the EC concession "frozen" in time at the conclusion of
the ITA? As indicated in Section II:B of this paper, the Complainants and
Third Parties to this dispute strongly criticized that the EC's argument (that
the ITA merely covers IT products existing in 1996) ignores the "enhance-
ment," "development," and "evolvement" aspects of the ITA.12 9
As discussed earlier, the core issue in EC-IT Products is whether the
possibility that a particular product would fall within the scope of an ITA
concession, especially those based on Attachment B of the ITA, should be
excluded in the technological development of that product. On this issue
the Panel should, at least, have considered two questions. First, to what
extent is the "state of technology" that existed at the time of the negotia-
tions relevant to determining the scope of the commitments?1 3 0 Second,
how should "technological development" and "product evolution" be dealt
with in interpreting concessions?' 3 '
Not surprisingly, however, the Panel avoided directly responding to
the arguments regarding "the circumstances of conclusion" made by the
parties proposed as "supplementary means" of interpretation. In the
Panel's view, "it is neither desirable nor possible to answer such questions
in the abstract and without reference to the terms of the concessions that
are being interpreted."' 32 In this context, the Panel explained that it had
applied the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, as
set out in Articles 31 of the Vienna Convention, and had examined the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the EC's commitment, in the context pro-
vided by the ITA, other relevant parts of the EC Schedule, and the sched-
ules of other WTO Members.' 33 Having said that, the Panel decided that
128. VCLT, supra note 12, art. 32 states:
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to deter-
mine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
129. Oral statement by Hong Kong, China at the First Substantive Meeting, European
Communities- Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Annex E-6,
q 6, WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R (Aug. 16, 2010).
130. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 7.596.
131. Id.
132. Id., 7.596.
133. Id., 9 7.597.
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"there is no need to consider further the particular status of technology at
the time of negotiating the concession in assessing the scope of the conces-
sion before the panel."1 34 Thus, for instance, the Panel did not consider the
question of whether the fact that DVI was developed after the conclusion of
the ITA should operate to exclude flat panel display devices with DVIs from
the scope of the concession. 13 5
While the Panel was prudent enough and did not allow itself to fall
into the trap of the "investigation" of the technological history of IT prod-
ucts, it departed from its interpretative approach and, to some degree,
responded to the parties' arguments regarding the state of technology at
the time of ITA negotiations. For example, in response to the EC's argument
that multifunctional monitors are "new products" that did not exist at the
time of the negotiations, the Panel indicated that "multifunctionality was
not unknown at the time of the negotiations."1 3 6 The Panel also cited fac-
tual evidence supporting its viewpoint that negotiators were at least aware
of a wide array of technology at the time of considering the "panel display
devices" concession.' 3 7
It is obvious that the Panel was reluctant to draw a firm conclusion on
how "technological development" should be addressed in interpreting con-
cessions. The reasoning was unsatisfying, and failed to say when negotia-
tors' awareness of new technology would be relevant to the determination
of the scope of the commitments.
2. Services Schedules: Technical Possibility and Commercial Reality
As described in Section Ill.A of this Article, both parties submitted a
significant amount of "evidence" in support of their positions regarding the
"circumstances of conclusion." The Chinese allegation was based on the
"Technical, legal and commercial impossibility," emphasizing that any
interpretation of China's relevant commitments under Sector 2D must nec-
essarily incorporate the circumstances surrounding the negotiations.' 3 8
China was of the view that the service in question was not part of its com-
mitments because at the time of the negotiations the sound recording dis-
tribution service only covered sound recordings in physical form. 139
The Panel found that evidence on the technical feasibility or commer-
cial reality of a service at the time of the commitment was relevant to deter-
mining the "common intention of Members" under Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.140 In this context, the Panel found that the evidence presented
by the parties suggested that the electronic distribution of music had
become a technical possibility and commercial reality before the entry into
force of China's GATS Schedule following its accession to the WTO on 11
134. Id., 1 7.600.
135. Id., 99 7.1235-7.1247.
136. Id., 7 7.601 (emphasis added).
137. Id., n. 807.
138. First Submission of China, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 9 482.
139. Id., 17 476-82.
140. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 9 7.1237.
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December 2001.141 in the Panel's view, the record also indicated that
China was aware of this fact.14 2 The Panel was, therefore, not persuaded
that the meaning of the phrase "sound recording distribution services"
could not extend to the distribution of sound recordings in non-physical
form because negotiators of China's GATS Schedule had at the time no
conception of the technical or commercial viability of this form of
distribution. 143
Regarding the circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty, the Appel-
late Body could have easily decided this issue based on the Panel's reason-
ing, but the Appellate Body instead took a different position and utilized a
different approach. The Appellate Body spent several paragraphs in the
China-Audiovisual Services report to clarify important aspects of the Panel's
reasoning and characterize the Panel as having "simply found that this ele-
ment did not establish that China could not have undertaken a commit-
ment on the electronic distribution of sound recordings in 2001."144 The
Appellate Body emphasized that the Panel "did not itself draw interpreta-
tive conclusions on the basis of the evidence of the conclusion of the
treaty."14 5
As the reasoning of the Appellate Body shows, the Appellate Body dis-
tanced itself from the Panel Report on this issue, and gently chided the
Panel by modifying the Panel's reasoning. 14 6 To some degree, the Appellate
Body's ambiguous stance on the insignificance of "technical possibility"
and "commercial reality" makes it seem that the issue has been slightly
addressed. The Appellate Body rejected China's argument about the factual
situation and the significance of the circumstances of the conclusion of the
treaty, implying that at least in this dispute the commercial or legal status
of the business at the time of China's accession was not relevant.
C. Identifying the Common Intention of Members?
The Appellate Body's assumption that schedules represent the com-
mon agreement among WTO Members, and should be interpreted accord-
ingly, becomes even more complex in the face of ever-changing technology.
In EC-Computer Equipment, a leading case on how technological change
may impact tariff schedules, when faced with the interpretation of "Auto-
matic Data Processing Equipment" in a tariff schedule, the Appellate Body
did not question whether it would be useful to examine how concessions
in schedules of goods and services were negotiated, drafted, and con-
cluded. However, it rejected the alternative to treaty interpretation-to inter-
pret schedules in the light of "legitimate expectations" of the exporting
WTO Members-on the ground that this would undermine the security
141. Id., 11 7.1235-7.1247.
142. Id., 7.1246.
143. Id., 7.1247.
144. Appellate Body Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 9, ' 408.
145. Id., 9[ 407-10.
146. Tania Voon & Andrew Mitchell, Open for Business? China's Telecommunications
Service Market and the WTO, J. INT'L EcON. L. (2010).
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and predictability of schedules. The Appellate Body upheld a rigid applica-
tion of DSU Article 3.2, and stressed that "the common intentions of the
Members" cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective and unilater-
ally determined expectations of one of the parties to the treaty. 14 7
Along these lines, as the reasoning of the Appellate Body in China-
Audiovisual Services shows, the Appellate Body rejected China's argument
about the factual situation-the technical or commercial viability of elec-
tronic distribution of sound recording-and about the significance of the
"circumstances of the conclusion of the treaty,"- that the electronic distri-
bution of sound recordings was unknown at the time of China's accession
to the WTO, and China was unaware of the existence of such services.' 4 8
In a more recent Panel report in EC-IT Products, the Panel again deter-
mined the scope of the EC tariff commitments on certain IT products.
Once again, it examined the ordinary meaning of the terms of the EC con-
cession, in the context provided by the ITA, other relevant parts of the EC
Schedule, and the schedules of other WTO Members. The Panel estab-
lished that the products in dispute were covered by the EC concession
based on the above approaches, implying that the fact that the EC was una-
ware of the state of technology that existed at the time of the negotiations is
of limited relevance to the question at issue.' 4 9
Both cases tackled the issue of whether the existence of certain tech-
nologies at the time of the conclusion of the treaty negotiations is relevant
to the interpretation of the tariff or service schedules, and both cases
reached confusing and self-contradictory conclusions: First, both panels
were convinced by the evidence submitted by the complaining parties that
the "new" technologies were known at the time of the treaty negotiation,
and that the responding parties to the disputes were aware of such techno-
logical development. Second, both panels took the position that even if it
were accepted that the responding parties' claims are factually accurate
that the products or services were unknown at the time of the negotiations,
such facts were of limited relevance to the questions at issue. In other
words, both panels did not themselves draw interpretative conclusions
based on evidence of the conclusion of the treaty. Finally, the "state of
technology" and the negotiators' subjective awareness might be relevant or
even significant in future cases, leaving open the possibility that another
WTO Member might make those arguments in a subsequent dispute.
The meaning of the circumstances of conclusion is not indicated in
the Vienna Convention. The circumstances that cause a treaty to be
enacted, affect its content, and attach to its conclusion are all factors that
are considered in practice.' 5 0 In theory, evidence on the technical feasibil-
ity or commercial reality of a product/service at the time of the commit-
ment indeed may constitute circumstances relevant to the interpretation of
147. Appellate Body Report, EC-Computer Equipment, supra note 14, 1 84.
148. Appellate Body Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 9, '1 407-10.
149. Panel Report, EC-IT Products, supra note 18, 7.597.
150. GARDINER, supra note 124, at 343.
2012 Renegotiate the WTO "Schedules of Commitments"?
its scope under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.15 We cannot ignore
the fact that all the parties involved in EC-IT Products and China-Audiovi-
sual Services submitted a significant number of exhibits in support of their
positions regarding the "circumstances of conclusion." It is understandable
that the panels and/or the Appellate Body would not dare to take a radical
position on this issue. However, given the potentially far-reaching conse-
quences of the Panel's conclusion on how to interpret "schedules of com-
mitments" in this rapidly changing digital era, one would expect that it
presented a well-reasoned legal analysis on Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.
D. Integrating the Principle of "Technological Neutrality" into the WTO
Law
In addition, in China-Audiovisual Services the Appellate Body's reason-
ing on "object and purpose" is of great practical significance and will have
significant implications for future disputes regarding interpretation of
schedules of commitments in the rapidly changing digital era. Although
different types of schedules vary in their structure, it will be interesting to
see how the reports of the Appellate Body in China-Audiovisual Services will
affect the possible appellate proceeding on EC-IT Products, particularly the
interpretation of Attachment B of the ITA.152 Is the term "monitor" "suffi-
ciently generic" that the definition of the terms may change over time? Is
the term "modem" a generic term that should not be interpreted in an
overly-narrow or technical sense? Do the tariff commitments set out in
Attachment B of the ITA constitute multilateral treaties with continuing
obligations so as to ensure that the tariff regimes will evolve over time?
In China-Audiovisual Services the Appellate Body seems to imply that
the content of "generic terms" in the schedules of commitments is assumed
by the Members to change through time. It did not, however, say anything
about how to determine whether a term is generic enough. Nor did it elab-
orate on the distinction between "time-bound" and "timeless" WTO obliga-
tions, leaving open the possibility for later WTO litigation to materialize
the meaning.15 3
Having said that, I am of the view that the notion of "generic terms"
and the principle of "technological neutrality"' 5 4 conceptually reinforce
each other, and the latter itself might well serve as the rationale for the
former. In U.S.-Gambling, the Panel stated that "a market access commit-
151. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 9 7.1237, n.685.
152. The EC pointed out that the multifunctional LCD monitor did not exist at the
time the concessions were being negotiated. This casts an important light on the circum-
stances under which the concessions were made in view of the extremely detailed techni-
cal language used in the narrative of the product definitions in attachment B to the ITA.
The EC stressed how the radical changes in monitor technology from the time the ITA
was negotiated have made it exceptionally difficult to define a "monitor" in order to
place it in the relevant legal framework.
153. See Appellate Body Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 9, ' 396.
154. Rolf H. Weber, Digital Trade in WTO-Law- Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 5
Asian J. WTO & Int'l Health L. & Pol'y 1, 16 (2010).
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ment ... implies the right of other Members' service suppliers to supply a
service through all means of delivery, whether by mail, telephone, Internet
etc., unless otherwise specified in a Member's Schedule." 155 As the United
States argued before the China-Audiovisual Services Panel, the GATS is tech-
nologically neutral in the sense that it does not contain any provisions that
distinguish between the different technological means through which a ser-
vice may be supplied.156 The United States invoked the principle of "tech-
nological neutrality" to argue that any practical differences between the
supply of sound recordings in physical and digital form are simply differ-
ences with respect to the "means of delivery."157 According to the principle
of technological neutrality, the differences between the physical and digital
distributions are not relevant to the interpretation of the scope of a GATS
commitment, unless specified in a Member's Schedule.' 58 The United
States further stressed that China's position, if accepted, would suggest
that the GATS and Members' commitments must be renegotiated each time
a new technology results in a new means of supplying a service. This
would be an unworkable outcome, and would be inconsistent with the
principle of technological neutrality.' 59 The GATS is sufficiently dynamic
to cover new technological innovations affecting the delivery of services.160
"Technological neutrality" has been well-established as a general regu-
latory principle under the International Telecommunication Union frame-
work.161 A far as possible, a technologically neutral position-the idea that
there should be equivalent treatment of equivalent services, regardless of
the delivery means-should be adopted by the regulator.162 In fact, in past
years many negotiating proposals have stressed the need to consider the
coverage of ICT-related commitments.16 3 Issues mentioned, among others,
mainly concerned digital convergence, the blurring distinction between
telecom, computer and audiovisual services, and the integration of the ICT
155. Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005); Panel Report, United
States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
6.285, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
156. First Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 7 54.
157. Id.
158. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, TI 7.1248, 7.1264.
159. Second Oral Statement of the U.S., China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77,
'T 46-53.
160. Id.
161. Alison Gillwald, Int'l Telecomm. Union (ITUI, Case Study: Broadband the Case of
South Africa, ITU Doc. 7 (Apr. 29, 2001).
162. ITU, World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF 2001): Report of the Secre-
tary-General on IP Telephony, at 23, Final Report (Jan. 31, 2001), available at http://
www.itu.int/osg/spu/wtpf/wtpf2001/sgreport/finalreport31Jan files/finalreport31Jan.
doc; see also ITU, Telecommunication Development Bureau: ITU-D Study Groups, ITU Doc.
1/090-E(Rev.1) (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/study-groups/
SGP_1998-2002/SGl/Documents/2000/090rle.doc.
163. Council for Trade in Ser's., Information Note by the Secretariat, 46, Doc.
JOB(05)/208 (Sept. 26, 2005).
Vol. 45428
2012 Renegotiate the WTO "Schedules of Commitments"?
industry. 164 The EU approach,165 for example, is designed to impact neu-
trally on different business models and technologies and to provide a way
forward that will be able to deal with future technologies, particularly
those involving convergence, 16 6 especially to deal with ambiguities arising
from convergence and rapid development of ICT market.16 7
The Panel and the Appellate Body offered no response to those argu-
ments regarding the principle of technological neutrality.16 8 It is apparent,
however, that the Appellate Body's reasoning in China-Audiovisual Services
on the basis of the notion of the "generic terms" is conceptually linked and
theoretically relevant to the principle of technological neutrality. The
United States and the Appellate Body have produced two closely linked
legal arguments, but the Appellate Body just missed an opportunity to elab-
orate on the principle of technological neutrality. I am of the view that the
Appellate Body's reasoning on the so-called "sufficiently generic terms"
and the US position on the principle of "technological neutrality" can be
mutually supportive and reinforcing. WTO Members and the Appellate
Body must seriously consider ways to integrate the principle of "technolog-
ical neutrality" into the WTO jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Information technology is eliminating historical differences between
devices and network platforms,169 as well as blurring the lines between
physical networks and the service providers that use those networks.1 70
EC-Computer Equipment, EC-IT Products, and China-Audiovisual Services
offer a creative space for treaty interpretation considering the digital con-
vergence trend.
The interpretation of schedules has been the subject of several panel
and Appellate Body reports in recent years, and one may anticipate that
ICT-related schedules will increasingly be challenged before the DSB. The
recent decisions of the panels and Appellate Body in EC-IT Products and
164. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Servs., Note by the Secretariat: Report
of the Meeting Held on 21, 22 and 25 February 2005, 46, Doc. TN/S/M/14 (Apr. 26,
2005).
165. Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the
European Communities: Classification in the Telecom Sector Under the WTO-GATS Frame-
work, Docs. TN/S/W/27, S/CSC/W/44 (Feb. 10, 2005); see also Council for Trade in
Services, Information Note by the Secretariat, supra note 163.
166. Peng, Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond, supra note 6, at
302-03.
167. Id.
168. Panel Report, China-Audiovisual Services, supra note 77, 9 7.1258.
169. Damien Geradin et al, Leveling the Playing Field: Is the WTO Adequately Equipped
to Prevent Anti-Competitive Practices in Telecommunications, in THE WTO AND GLOBAL
CONVERGENCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND AUDIO-VISUAL SERVICES 131, 146 (Damien
Geradin & Davide Luff eds., 2004); see also David Luff, Telecommunications and Audiovi-
sual Services: Considerations for a Convergence Policy at the WTO Level, 38 J. WORLD
TRADE 1059 (2004).
170. MARK HUKILL ET AL., ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION CONVERGENCE: POLICY CHANGES
IN ASIA (Mark Hukill, Ryota Ono, & Chandrasekhar Vallath eds., 2000).
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China-Audiovisual Services may become significant leading cases-and it is
highly likely that the WTO case law will be built incrementally upon them.
Given the potentially far-reaching consequences of the panels/Appellate
Body interpretation, one would expect that they presented a well-reasoned
legal basis.
I conclude that the Panel appropriately recognized in EC-IT Products
that the ITA is not relevant in determining the object and purpose of the
WTO Agreement and therefore the complainants' overbroad interpretative
approach may compromise the legal certainty and predictability of tariff
concessions. The Panel's finding is remarkable in that it resolved an ongo-
ing discussion on whether the objectives of the ITA participants of having
participants' tariff regimes evolve in a manner that "enhances market
access for information technology products" can be considered a basis for
determining the object and purpose of the GATT 1994. Nevertheless, the
Panel should have fully elaborated upon the question of in what situation
and to what extent can the "state of technology" that existed at the time of
the negotiations be relevant to determining the scope of the commitments.
I also conclude that two aspects of the Appellate Body's decision in
China-Audiovisual Services have significant implications for the question of
how to interpret schedules of commitments in this rapidly changing digital
era. First, despite the lack of legal reasoning, the Appellate Body took a
brave but necessary position on the issue of whether the definition of
"sound recording distribution services" evolves over time. Secondly, the
Appellate Body clarified that the fact that a service was technically feasible
and commercially viable at the time of a Member's WTO accession does
not necessarily mean that that Member's GATS commitments include that
service. As the Appellate Body's view alone is not a satisfactory basis for
such an important holding, this article suggests that the conclusion ought
to be supported in light of the principle of "technological neutrality."
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